The counterattack reserve is not under the control of the motorized rifle battalion commander and will not be released unles s the BLUFOR's no-penetration line is in danger of collapsing or the BLUFOR has been fixed or destroyed and a counterattack is possible.
For the security-zone defense to be effective, the ambush positions and the security zone have to break contact with the BLUFOR units and move into a hide position.
This deceives the BLUFOR scouts or allows them to emplace fighting positions or obstacles without being detected.
After the security-zone commander makes contact with the BLUFOR and the decision to withdraw from the security zone is made, the next step is to determine where smoke is needed most to aid in the withdrawal.
After the security zone has withdrawn from contact, it attempts to move into a hide position on the flank of the BLUFOR.
This does not mean that elements of this doctrine would be ineffective if used by the BLUFOR units.
Some aspects of this doctrine would be easy for a BLUFOR unit to implement.
The BLUFOR must secure the area around an OPEOR obstacle once it is encountered on the JRTC battlefield.
Any marking system that allows a driver to stray from the lane, go around the marking system, or knock down the markers will lead to BLUFOR casualties.
Properly securing the obstacle will prevent the OPFOR from observing the attacking BLUFOR and calling observed indirect fire.
The OPFOR in the defense shifts forces to affect BLUFOR troops during a breach.
Each successive wave of BLUFOR trying to breach and rescue fallen comrades only adds to the pain of the process.