The RBNZ law has more clearly specified accountability provisions than the CBBH law: the Governor can be removed for failing to achieve the agreed target.
In the CBBH law there is a clause that says any board member, and the Governor is a board member who can be removed if s/he 'violates the Currency Board rule established in this law' (CBBH, 1997).
Given that the process that was used to develop the CBBH law produced a good outcome, it is worth briefly analysing the process that generated this favourable outcome.
The laws thus become very politically focused rather than technically focused, as was the CBBH law.
That is not a surprise as I set the structures up in the CBBH and in doing so I have applied many of the lessons I learned in New Zealand.
I applied as much of the New Zealand model to the CBBH as I could.
Both the RBNZ and the CBBH have opted for quite detailed and formalised decision-making and performance monitoring structures.
The CBBH has an annual strategic plan that is developed by the management and approved by the board.
Each area of the CBBH then prepares a more detailed work plan based on the strategic plan.
The third area in the plan is a listing of the key risks the CBBH faces over the year ahead.
The development of the strategic plan has gone through three phases in the CBBH.
Both the RBNZ and the CBBH have very detailed and formalised annual budget processes.