This problem partially revisits the same issue the [section] 1981 retaliation claim in CBOCS West confronted regarding the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
In response to his criticism, the majority (as it did in CBOCS West) relied heavily on Sullivan.
259) The importance of stare decisis controlled the outcomes of CBOCS West and Gomez-Perez, (260) while in Jackson the Court ignored important precedent.
276) As mentioned above, although the reliance on Sullivan may have been appropriate to discern congressional intent in Jackson, this rationale loses its force when applied to [section] 1981 in CBOCS West and the ADEA in Gomez-Perez.
Notably, like Sullivan, two of the three recent implied retaliation cases--Jackson and CBOCS West--involved third-party reporters of illegal discrimination.
The CBOCS West Court upheld a retaliation claim for [section] 1981 in part because its sister statute, [section] 1982, was held by Sullivan to provide "protection from retaliation for reasons related to the enforcement of the express statutory right.
As in Sullivan, Jackson, and CBOCS West, the plaintiff in Crawford was more of a reporter of discrimination than a victim asserting her own rights.
Viewed from this perspective, Jackson, CBOCS West, and Gomez-Perez do not mean that the Court will imply retaliation protection only in discrimination cases.
Ultimately, then, the Antiretaliation Principle may tip the balance, as it did in Jackson, Burlington Northern, CBOCS West, Gomez-Perez, and Crawford, in which similarly strong interpretative arguments could be made regarding the applicability of retaliation protection.
846, 852-53 (2009) (interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); CBOCS W.
The employee in CBOCS West was dismissed because he had complained to managers that an assistant manager had fired a coworker on the basis of race.
160) The CBOCS West Court accepted Jackson's interpretation that Sullivan permitted a retaliation claim under [section] 1982.