CICIRChina Institute of Contemporary International Relations
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Mexico City: Senado de la Republica, CICIR y UNAM-CECHIMEX, pp.
Later, in 2003, the CICIR crisis-management group distilled Hu's list down to six principles: "seek peaceful resolution" and don't think of punishing the other side; "seek limited and realistic goals"; exercise restraint over one's behavior; maintain communications with the other side; handle issues separately (e.
Analysts from other research offices and centers at CICIR are allocated on a part-time basis to the center.
81) As the 2003 CICIR study put it, in crisis management the leadership needs to prevent a bilateral political crisis from expanding into, or influencing, a domestic social one.
For example, in its 2003 study cited above, CICIR suggested that an ideal system needs a small, powerful decision-making hub served by a crisis-management general-staff mechanism.
A CICIR official has said that the concept of zaoshi is not language used at the top levels of civilian decision making but is PLA language; interview, June 2011.
Yuan Peng, director of the CICIR Institute of American Studies, emphasizes this high-level consensus on avoiding conflict as a joint imperative of the United States and China (Yuan 2012).
Chen Xiangyang of CICIR and Pang Zhongying of Renmin University hold a middle-ground view, pointing to elements of both cooperation and competition in the US-China relationship that both sides must balance (Chen 2013; Pang 2013).
As Niu Xinchun of CICIR indicates, the biggest factors conditioning US-China mutual strategic trust are Asia Pacific security issues and bilateral political differences (Niu 2013).
As Niu Xinchun of CICIR has indicated, the biggest misconception of US-China relations perpetuated by realist thinking is that "structural issues between the rising power and the current power make the fundamental nature of Sino-US relations one of competition, contradiction and conflict" (Niu 2011, 1-2).
As Yuan Peng of CICIR notes, this trend raises concern over the extent to which the United States and China are really aligned in their visions of the future relationship (Yuan 2013a).
On a similar note, CICIR scholar Zhao Hongtu writes that while oil security will continue to be a challenging and controversial issue, China cannot hope to compete with the United States in naval development and can best safeguard its interests by helping Southeast Asian states develop an indigenous capacity to address nonstate challenges.