Aid groups could comply with the statute by providing advice in a forum for which a DFTO has not provided exclusive sponsorship.
Suppose an aid group negotiates with a DFTO about gaining access to a disaster-stricken region controlled by the DFTO.
Suppose that the aid group does not agree to provide the DFTO with a percentage of its aid.
To rebut a claim that the aid group had knowingly provided assistance to a DFTO that diverted aid, the group could present evidence of institutional controls.
The material support statute should protect human rights monitoring, which serves a global public, not the DFTO.
section][section] 2339 A (b)(1), 2339 (g)(4) (2006)) (prohibiting provision to DFTO of "any property, tangible or intangible, or service," including "financial services," "personnel," "training," and "expert advice or assistance"); see also Robert M.
That critique begins from the premise that not all donations to a DFTO are intended to be used, or in fact are used, to facilitate terrorist acts; some DFTOs after all are hybrid groups engaged in both legal and illegal activity.
158) The problem is that notwithstanding good intentions, donors of financial support cannot actually control how a DFTO will spend the money.
Even assuming that the provision of equipment or services to a DFTO involves elements of expression or association, the impact of [section] 2339B on such First Amendment interests again would be incidental, and again O'Brien-style intermediate scrutiny would provide the relevant analytical framework.
The reflexive interpretation of personnel in substance criminalizes at least some forms of membership in a DFTO.
165) Understood this way, [section] 2339B punishes the conduct of providing a human resource to the DFTO, while leaving ample opportunity for those who wish to do so to express symbolically their support for the group through nominal affiliation or independent advocacy.
But even assuming it is correct that the direction or control limitation preserves space for nominal membership in a DFTO, the question remains whether the First Amendment tolerates direct suppression of more substantial forms of association absent proof of knowledge or intent.