Correlational findings (see Table 1) speaking to the concurrent validity of the GSES suggested that while golf self-efficacy was unrelated to the number of years golfers had played and how often persons practiced, GSES scores related to how much time they spent practicing when they did practice.
As expected, and consistent with evidence supporting the scale's construct validity, GSES scores were moderately and positively associated with both general and social self-efficacy (see Table 1).
In addition, those golfers whose GSES scores were higher indicated that they had fewer problem areas in their games, were more likely to prepare themselves prior to practicing and competing, and endorsed to a greater extent a variety of factors that they thought had helped them to improve their games (see Table 1).
An ANOVA of GSES scores broken down by 3 levels of skill, given the distribution of verified handicaps in the sample, where cell sizes were at least 39 (handicaps < 9.
Correlational findings indicated that GSES scores predicted players' unadjusted tournament scores (where lower scores index better performance, independent of handicap) in rounds 1, 3, and 4.
Reliability, Factor Structure, Concurrent, and Construct Validity of the GSES
The findings presented here speak to the concurrent validity of the GSES, wherein it was principally related to players' handicaps, and importantly, to the construct validity of the GSES, wherein golf self-efficacy was related to, but nevertheless separate from generalized self-efficacy.
Fair and transparent accounting demands that the GSES not receive the political benefits of off-balance-sheet accounting.
The ongoing, unlimited bailout of the GSES will hit the taxpayers for much more than the $150 billion cost of the notorious savings and loan collapse of the 1980s.
As Warren Buffett and other former and current investors who assign extremely low price-to-earnings ratios to the GSEs have concluded, the fastest growth of the GSES is behind them.
Importance of non-shareholding stakeholders Perhaps the most compelling reason of all for the GSES to deemphasize high-powered executive compensation contracts is that relevant and important stakeholder groups extend far beyond shareholders.
If evidence suggested that the GSEs' executive compensation plans themselves led to excessive risk-taking, then greater regulatory oversight over their executive compensation programs may be warranted even when financial indicators suggest the GSES are doing well.