Indeed the best predictor of the behavior of LPGCs is not the fact that they are carrying guns, but rather their limited license to use guns in self-defense.
The regulatory filters used to exclude people from owning and carrying guns make LPGCs more trustworthy (on those measures) than the general population.
The basic point is that carrying a gun does not appear to be a radically transformative driver of violent behavior; it has not caused LPGCs to act out of character by escalating mundane conflicts into shootouts.
Experience refutes the dire predictions that guns on the hips of LPGCs would transform fender benders and shopping cart bumps into shootouts.
Now compare police, who relative to LPGCs, operate under a far broader license to carry, draw, point, and fire guns.
60) But just as the aggressive, preemptive behavior of police is predicted by their license to escalate violence, so too is the behavior of LPGCs predicted by the limited license under which they operate.
65) These dynamics are underscored in comparison to LPGCs.
LPGCs are granted a license to react defensively to deadly threats by an assailant who has made the first move.
69) Combined with the discretion and license already discussed, it is easy to see how an acute sensitivity to the possibility that mundane circumstances might spin into deadly encounters might result in police drawing, pointing, and firing guns under circumstances in which LPGCs would be foolish to consider that option.
High-profile incidents like the Trayvon Martin shooting demonstrate the dire consequences when LPGCs push the boundaries of their license.
All of this prompts re-examination of the conversation about the training of LPGCs, and particularly the about the scope and value of police training for LPGCs.
If police training is intertwined with the preemptive violence and escalation that are embedded in police license, then we should be wary of policies that would train LPGCs like police.