Although the Soviet premier rejected a comprehensive treaty, Washington interpreted his interest in a LTBT to be a positive response to the president's American University speech.
Regarding the latter, development of Soviet-American negotiations makes clear that the LTBT was intended to serve the common goal of preventing a nuclear Germany and a nuclear China.
Such clarification materialized over the last two weeks of intense negotiations leading to conclusion of the LTBT on August 5, 1963: since Khrushchev was unable to integrate China, he seemed to aim at isolating it.
Kennedy's good working relationship with Macmillan was one very important piece in the puzzle of political consultation leading up to the LTBT.
67) When Khrushchev in his July 2 speech in East Berlin explicitly linked a LTBT and a nonaggression pact, Kennedy decided to inform Adenauer that he thought a nonaggression pact worth exploring.
Although the Soviets subsequently dropped the link between the test ban and a nonaggression pact, Adenauer was shocked that Kennedy had moved so quickly to conclude the LTBT without close bilateral consultation.
Secretary Rusk's meetings with Adenauer and senior cabinet members made clear that Germany would sign the LTBT.
75) On August 4, 1963, President de Gaulle informed the American president that France would not sign the LTBT.
The fact that there was no domestic political consensus on the desirability of both a comprehensive and a limited test ban further complicated the multifaceted negotiation process leading up to the LTBT.
79) As Khrushchev focused attention on a LTBT with his speech in East Berlin of July 2 and Harriman prepared his mission to Moscow, the JCS made a last effort to slow down the negotiation process gathering momentum.
He talked to each of the chiefs individually; in addition, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Director of the CIA John McCone, and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Glenn Seaborg explained to the JCS why they supported the LTBT from their perspectives.