The LVAR instead captures some of the persistent in-sample fluctuations and projects a further rise in housing investment and the growth rate of house prices before it returns close to the sample mean in 2007.
Third, the LVAR results in Figure 2B are, however, less clear.
Figure 3 shows for the DVAR (shaded areas) and the LVAR (dotted lines) the 68 percent posterior probability regions of the estimated impulses.
One difference worth noting is that, relative to the LVAR specification, the DVAR incorporates larger and more persistent effects on house prices and the GDP deflator.
Turning to a monetary policy shock, the LVAR results in Figure 4 show that a persistent 25-basis-point tightening of the federal funds rate has the usual delayed negative effects on real GDP and the GDP deflator.
This can be verified by looking at the contribution of the three shocks to the historical boom and bust episode since 2000, as depicted in Figure 6A for the DVAR and 6B for the LVAR.
The LVAR results depicted in Figure 6B give similar indications, although they generally attribute an even larger role to the housing demand shocks.
In this section, we use the two specifications of the BVAR--the LVAR and the DVAR--to calculate MCIs for the U.
Figure 7A shows for the DVAR and 7B for the LVAR the estimated 68 percent probability regions for the MCI of CLMM (blue dotted lines) and the MCI of BT (gray shaded areas) based on one-year-ahead annual output growth (left column) and two-year-ahead annual inflation (right column) using the following indicators of monetary conditions: the federal funds rate (first row); the federal funds rate and the term spread (second row); and the federal funds rate, the term spread, and real house prices (third row).
These results differ marginally when the LVAR specification is used (compare Figure 7B with 7A).