16) By including sentencing costs in SARs, MOSAC is trying to nudge judges to issue less punitive sentences than they would if cost information was issued in an annual report.
19) But MOSAC does not report these predicted rates to judges.
22) MOSAC presents these average recidivism rates as though they were useful information for predicting whether a particular offender is more likely to recidivate if sentenced to prison versus some alternative sentence.
Finally, MOSAC describes the recommended sentences in SARS as average sentences derived from actual practice in Missouri; (24) however, it is apparent that this conclusion is not quite correct since recommended sentences appear to be lower than average sentences in many instances.
It should be apparent that MOSAC has different preferences than judges and exploits its role as a provider of information to try to manipulate judges into selecting less punitive sentences than they would otherwise.
Finally, we must recognize that MOSAC has its own preferences that may deviate from the preferences of voters, legislators, and judges.
If some judges are more susceptible to nudging than other judges, then the activities of MOSAC may increase sentencing disparities across otherwise comparable offenders.