Perhaps recognizing the tenuous nature of its logic, the NCWF court fell back on a public policy justification, noting:
The NCWF court reached a similar result on the question of whether the statute of limitations had already run on the claim, though via a distinct methodology.
Having already dismissed the statute of limitations argument, the NCWF court nonetheless went on in dicta to explain how it would have resolved the claim if 28 U.
It is curious to note that NCWF, having already established that a continuing violation existed for the purposes of subject matter jurisdiction, did not extend the doctrine to neatly dismiss the statute of limitations argument.
A distinction, according to NCWF and Theis, lies in the claim that gives citizens standing to sue.
Beyond the common law analogy, further support for distinguishing citizen suit jurisdiction from statute of limitations defenses under the continuing violations doctrine is conspicuously lacking in both NCWF and Theis's argument.
193) Most courts applying the continuing violations doctrine have liberally interpreted sections 301, 309, and 505, and have merely incanted NCWF or the concurrence in Gwaltney to explain how their interpretations of those sections agree with the CWA.
Nonetheless, NCWF correctly recognized the conflict between the roots and goals of the CWA and the insufficient means incorporated therein to achieve those goals.