performance, and how the NNWS
may react to the perceived
In the case of Europe, all EURATOM NNWS
signed the NPT in 1969 (although not France, which was an NWS), but they ratified the NPT in 1975 only after they had collectively bargained the exact terms of the IAEA-EURATOM safeguards agreement in 1973.
The Model Additional Protocol is intended to apply universally to both NWS and NNWS
, but has not thus far been treated as mandatory under international practice.
In addition to being NNWS
, another reason states such as Denmark and Norway have a particular interest in the creation of a NWFZ in the Arctic is a conscious memory of the Danish experience during the height of the Cold War at Thule Air Base in 1968.
McNamara judges that the United States' retention of its nuclear arsenal as a mainstay of military power sends the message to the NNWSs
that America, "with the strongest conventional military force in the world, require[s] nuclear weapons," thus undermining nonproliferation efforts.
Thus the current Strategic Concept of NATO promises that the Alliance will continue to ignore Articles I and II (this arrangement actually goes back to the origins of the Treaty) and that NATO will instead "maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe" in NNWS
127) The NPT was crafted as a kind of a "grand bargain" between Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS
), (128) resting upon the shared interests of NWS and NNWS
in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the promise of the availability of peaceful nuclear applications in NNWS
NAM is reluctant to extend the NPT until substantive progress is made in six areas that it maintains are necessary to ensure NNWS
non-proliferation (the NNWS
pledge never to manufacture or otherwise
Arguably the crux of nonproliferation measures, "negative security assurances refer to the promises of NWS to never use nuclear weapons against a NNWS
so long as this state forever renounces its attempt to acquire these bombs.
More precisely, for the nuclear balance between NWS and NNWS
to remain as static over the next quarter century as it was between 1970 and 1995 under the NPT regime, China must not only adhere to NWS provisions within the treaty, it must also take a leadership role in nonproliferation diplomacy between NWS and its Third World friends that are on the verge of "going nuclear.
One of the three main pillars of the NPT, for example, concerns each party's "inalienable right" to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and many NNWS
parties vigorously complain that the advanced civil nuclear technology holders have failed to fulfill their end of the bargain about facilitating "the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information" (191) for those ends.