Suffice it to say that, in PFEL, two of the world's leading scholars and teachers of law and psychology (20) distill a huge body of information and present their own opinions across the wide landscape of trial rules, procedures, and players.
The panoramic view of PFEL blurs some details, and a number of its comments leave subtleties unstated.
The Bayesian account of relevance that PFEL cites is Professor Richard Lempert's27 lucid exposition of the "likelihood ratio" and the "regret matrix" as heuristic models28 for defining "relevant" evidence in Rule 401 and explaining the risks of "misleading the jury" and "prejudice" that Rule 403 requires judges to balance against "probative value.
In short, the Bayesian model of inference that PFEL invokes is one way to think about relevance, probative value, and the counterweights.
Having questioned some of the statements in PFEL about relevance and probative value, I want to return to PFEL's broader message that these concepts are amenable to clarification from the perspectives of psychology and related disciplines.
PFEL reproduces most of the Federal Rules of Evidence to generate 30 pages (9 percent) of its text.
PFEL ably surveys the efficacy of methods to help jurors reason as the law would like them to under the heading of "Instructions to Disregard and to Limit.
Inasmuch as PFEL concerns effects of mental contamination (and full disclosure is always valuable), I should note that Professor Saks and I worked together for years as colleagues at Arizona State University and as co-authors of the treatise DAVID L.
PFEL is not the place to find complete bibliographies, formal meta-analyses, and filigreed literature reviews.