Regarding program partners and strategies, PROPAZ worked with various actors although it dealt more regularly with Track II actors (academics, local NGOs, and mid-level government bureaucrats).
In this instance, PROPAZ identified local leaders in selected communities and trained them in mediation in order to build a local capacity to prevent, mediate, and resolve d0isputes.
Another element of PROPAZ that drew inspiration from the conflict transformation approach, and especially Lederach's work, was its commitment to supporting indigenous or local resources for dealing with conflict.
37) This initiative emerged independently of PROPAZ, when two senior members of the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) explored the possibility of bringing local actors together to address unresolved land conflicts in the area of Coban, which had destabilized the region.
PROPAZ was instrumental in assisting the work of these local peace-builders while the Mesa was in its formative stages.
Despite its limitations, PROPAZ support for the Mesa de Coban represents a fine example of this strategy.
46) Still, whereas Camacho and others consider PROPAZ an inadequate tool for addressing conflicting cosmic visions, Dunsmore believes it is possible to make the inevitable interface between divergent forces constructive.
The problem of land was identified by the PROPAZ program as a critical source of conflict in Guatemala.
While the purpose of this article was not to evaluate the PROPAZ program, something needs to be said about its results.
The overarching paradigm calls into question the long-term relevance of a program like PROPAZ because, even if it serves in a particular moment to advance a process of dialogue, one cannot help but wonder if it is in fact acting as a firefighter rather than a tool for transformation, given the broader neoliberal institutional context within which it functions.
At that time, the peace-building portfolio included programs aimed at: (1) conflict prevention and resolution (the PROPAZ pilot program); (2) strengthening the electoral system (assistance to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal); (3) modernizing political parties and the party system (the Program of Democratic Values and Political Management); and (4) supporting the national peace and reconciliation process (mine clearing).
In May 2003, the PROPAZ program was slowly phased out.