(1982),
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
The book also reproduces Anscombe's review of Saul Kripke's
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, in which she points at the mistaken interpretation Kripke gives of Wittgenstein on rule-following and where she turns the so-called sceptical argument into an interesting challenge against Wittgenstein's claims on learning and following a rule.
of New York-Graduate Center) Naming and Necessity and
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. His focus is on material that is probably common to most undergraduate courses in Western philosophy, especially his rejection of the description theory, essence and materialism, the skeptical paradox, and the argument against private language.
Kripke,
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1982); Norman Malcolm, Nothing is Hidden (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986); Stephen Hilmy, The Later Wittgenstein: The Emergence of a New Philosophical Method (New York: Blackwell Publishers, 1987); Eike von Savigny, Wittgenstein's "Philosophische Untersuchungen": Ein Buch fur Leser (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994); Meredith Williams, Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning: Towards a Social Conception of Mind (London: Routledge, 1999).
Kripke, S., 1982,
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982.
(1982),
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition.
Kripke in
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Harvard University Press, 1982) believe that he has a purely 'communitarian' solution to the paradox of interpretation: conformity with the community's use of the rule provides the standard of correctness.