In less poetic words: If you continue with this character assassination, I might reveal some well-kept secrets about the party and previous AKP
The victory of Turkey's Islamist rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP
) -- on what critics argue was a campaign built on fear and polarisation and party supporters contest was affirmation of its support among voters -- now leaves open the question of how the AKP
will rule in the deeply divided country.
With 98 per cent of the vote counted, the AKP
had won 49.
would like to have all the reins in its own hands until the election so it can make sure that they get the votes they need for a majority.
was founded in 2001 by Erdogan, ex-president Abdullah Gul, deputy PM Bulent Arinc and other associates.
It may or may not target the Koc group or any other group, but one does not have to be an oracle to predict that the AKP
will take steps to radically change the capital structure in the country if it secures high electoral support in the June 7 elections.
This peculiarity of the AKP
came to light in both candidate selection and election campaign process.
Even though AKP
was successful in pushing for major sweeping reforms and changes to the 1982 constitution (as a result of national referendum in September 2010), its inconsistent and vague language -- regarding certain civil and political rights and their interpretations -- still prevail.
Since the AKP
came to power in Ankara in 2002, there has been an intense debate over whether the party's Middle East-focused foreign policy has genuinely made Turkey a regional power with influence in Middle Eastern capitals.
officials delivering withering assessments of the competence, honesty, and intellectual capabilities of the members of the AKP
government, and a string of AKP
government ministers went on national television to denounce all of the Wikileaks documents as part of an Israeli plot to try to blacken Turkey's international reputation.
There are also concerns that the Islamic leaning AKP
is using the European constitutional reform recommendations as an excuse to bring the military and judiciary - known to be the custodians of the secular state - under its control to pursue its Islamic agenda.
Instead of merely being an introduction to the political identity of the ruling Islamist party, however, the book makes the case that the AKP
has lost its potential to democratize Turkish politics.