Post connects this framework to the division of resources "within" and "outside" of government organizations, (90) just as the Court does in AOSI.
Sometimes an explicit statement of belief is an essential part of the program; indeed, that is precisely what the government argued in AOSI.
If, as was arguably true in AOSI, the fund recipients are oriented to a common goal, much like members of a private organization, then they lie within the program.
Another way to understand AOSI is as a case about market transactions and permissible consent to economic offers.
In both AOSI and NFIB, the most straightforward solution to the fund recipients' complaint seems to be for them to decline the funds and thereby avoid the objectionable condition.
As Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion alleged, the majority in AOSI pussyfoots around the lack of coercion," which he attributed to the fact that "[t]he majority cannot credibly say that this speech condition is coercive, so it does not.
125) Justice Ginsburg, who would later see coercion in AOSI, saw only an irresistibly good deal in NFIB: "all that matters, it appears, is whether States can resist the temptation of a given federal grant.
AOSI does, however, suggest new ways to think about it.
The government has no duty to fund such programs, and characterizing them as entitlements--which AOSI and NFIB implicitly do (131)--requires an account of baselines set by statute, history, prediction, or some other method.
Though states stood to lose 10 percent of their overall budgets if they declined the Medicaid expansion, many organizations involved in the AOSI litigation depended on the government for up to two-thirds of their funding.
140) The practical and doctrinal stakes are different in AOSI and Citizens United v.
In fact, the Policy Requirement challenged in AOSI was apparently the first time Congress had ever imposed an ideological pledge as a condition for funding.