Then now why is the international community showing little or no support to the R-ARCSS even when there is much more inclusivity, some progress and a higher momentum compared to those in the post-July 2016 ARCSS era?
I do not agree with him that the international community was diddled in the post-July 2016 funding of the ARCSS. This is because the writings were very clear that the ARCSS was not being implemented during and after the July 2016 clashes.
Now, the R-ARCSS provides that, within two weeks of the signing of the Revitalised ARCSS, the IGAD Executive Secretariat, taking into account the decision of the 55th Extra- Ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 30-31, 2016, shall appoint an Independent Boundaries Commission (IBC) for the Republic of South Sudan.
The Agreement, among others, provides that immediately upon the signing of the Revitalised ARCSS, the IGAD Mediation shall appoint a Technical Boundary Committee (TBC) to define and demarcate the tribal areas of South Sudan as they stood on 1 January 1956 and the tribal areas in dispute in the country.
The senior post holders in the transitional government to be formed per the revitalized ARCSS include the President, the First Vice President, Four Vice Presidents, Speakers and Deputy Speakers of the two houses of the National Legislature, Members of the Legislative Assembly and Members of the Council of States, National Cabinet Ministers, State Governors, State Members of Parliament and State Cabinet Ministers, etc.
For example, Chapter One of the ARCSS being revitalized provided for procedures for replacements of the President and the First Vice President in Article 5.3 and 6.4 respectively.
The internal Constitution or rules and regulations should define the mode of decision making within each party on matters related to the revitalized ARCSS i.e.
Both at party or entity and alliance/coalition levels there must be internal Constitutions or rules and regulations defining the mode of decision making within each party on matters related to the revitalized ARCSS. This will ensure accountability and adherence to the Agreement.
At the lower levels, Article 101 (j) of the TCRSS also remains problematic as it gives the president the powers to remove a state Governor and/or dissolve a state legislative assembly "in the event of a crisis in the state that threatens national security and territorial integrity." Both ARCSS and the current "Bridging Proposal" are silent on this provision.
On the Judiciary, ARCSS provides that it shall be independent and shall subscribe to the principle of separation of powers and the supremacy of the rule of law, in accordance with the TCRSS, 2011.
If not, why and what shall be the implications on the period of the revitalized ARCSS?
These are very crucial for the purposes of peace, holding the parties accountable and ensuring that the terms of the revitalized ARCSS are observed.