Given the ASGT strategy, once a leader unilaterally defects, no agent in the other nation will ever cooperate with that leader again.
As shown earlier, under the ASGT strategy, if an agent unilaterally defects, then the agent is removed from office.
Provided that accountable agents care sufficiently about keeping their jobs (large [psi]), the ASGT strategy facilitates cooperation even between relatively impatient nations.
When agents are accountable, the ASGT strategy facilitates cooperation between nations through two mechanisms.
Unless both agents are politically accountable, the superiority of the ASGT strategy is lost.
Figure 3 illustrates the discount factor required to support cooperation under both the grim trigger strategy and the ASGT strategy as a function of the value of holding office, [psi].
Yet the ASGT strategy is more robust than grim trigger on another dimension as well.
For example, one implication of the ASGT theory is that accountable leaders who defect are likely to be removed.