As shown earlier, under the ASGT strategy, if an agent unilaterally defects, then the agent is removed from office.
Provided that accountable agents care sufficiently about keeping their jobs (large [psi]), the ASGT strategy facilitates cooperation even between relatively impatient nations.
When agents are accountable, the ASGT strategy facilitates cooperation between nations through two mechanisms.
Unless both agents are politically accountable, the superiority of the ASGT strategy is lost.
While obviously the superiority of the ASGT strategy rests on this inequality holding, given the primacy of office holding for Homo politicus, we believe such conditions generally prevail and that a leader would be unlikely to prefer adherence to, for example, a trade agreement instead of remaining in power.
Figure 3 illustrates the discount factor required to support cooperation under both the grim trigger strategy and the ASGT strategy as a function of the value of holding office, [psi].
Yet the ASGT strategy is more robust than grim trigger on another dimension as well.
For example, one implication of the ASGT theory is that accountable leaders who defect are likely to be removed.