(redirected from Air Base Defense)
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References in periodicals archive ?
This situation drives the need for enhancing the joint doctrine for air base defense found in JP 3-10 to provide directive guidance that will assist in identifying the SAM threat to aerial approach and departure corridors as a joint force priority (and delineate component responsibilities for addressing it) during the tasking process in order to incorporate these requirements into either the JFACC or JFLCC allocated forces and command and control responsibilities.
This approach to seaport facility defense should instruct efforts to revise the Air Base Defense Considerations section in JP 3-10.
The Air Force's official history of air base defense in Vietnam illustrates how the competing priorities of ground commanders made the commitment of Air Force ground combat power to protecting air bases an operational imperative: "Reliance on other services for the defense of air bases was a problem for the [Royal Air Force] on Crete, the Luftwaffe in North Africa, and the [United States Air Force] in Vietnam.
As predicted by a RAND study on air base defense, "We expect that [air base] opponents might pursue three different objectives with these [future] attacks: (1) destroy high-value assets critical to USAF operations, (2) temporarily suppress sortie generation at a critical moment in a crisis or conflict, or (3) create a 'strategic event'--an incident as decisive politically as loss of a major battle is military or operationally--that could reduce U.
Briar, "Sharpening the Eagle's Talons: Assessing Air Base Defense," Air and Space Power Journal 18, no.
Fox, Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, 1961-1973 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1979), 171.
In spite of these issues, Air Force doctrine clearly defines air base defense as "actions taken by force protection forces in theater preparing for an overt attack by level I, II, or III threats.
The Air Force will provide in-place and deployable air base defense forces who are organized, trained, and equipped to undertake force protection missions in accordance with the Air Force [Wartime Mobilization Plan].
The key to understanding this section and the doctrine of air base defense lies in the definition of TAOR.
In its discussion of survivability, AFDD 2-4 states that "at a minimum, successful air base defense requires basic weapons and tactics training for all deployed Air Force personnel.