Presented in Table 1, our comparisons demonstrate that the study sample was not statistically different from the excluded cases in the original CAPTC experimental group sample, with the exceptions that the sample in this analysis was older at baseline.
Other studies using ADD data across all 14 IDA programs have assessed additional institutional characteristics, including incentives, such as match rate, which varied across the IDA programs; expectations, such as savings targets; and facilitation, measured by direct deposit (Grinstein-Weiss, Wagner, Ssewamala, 2005; Sherraden, 2008; Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004).Within CAPTC, match rates were fixed for all participations with a 2:1 match for homeownership and 1:1 match for all other asset goals.
Thus, caution should be used in interpreting results of this study in that the measure may not fully represent the population of people with disabilities within CAPTC. Second, compared with the overall U.S.
Prior research using CAPTC data interpret a zero balance as indicating that someone dropped out of the program, is yet to start saving, or has successfully completed the program (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2006).
As shown in Table 2, we identified more than one-third of participants in the CAPTC experimental group as reporting a disability at either wave 2 (2001) or wave 3 (2003) of data collection (39%, n = 145).
In other words, a CAPTC participant with a disability saved nearly $330 less than a nondisabled participant during the five years of participating in the IDA program.