The USA also appears to take the most extreme initial position; it may well be that as the CDMP commences the US Government realizes the weakness and isolation of its position and adopts what it views as a most likely outcome which still ensures some progress.
The comparison across these scenarios suggests that the senior leaders cannot, on their own, drive consensus among the actors in the baseline simulation and that their high levels of influence do not translate into an ability to dominate the CDMP. This can be seen as an indication of the weight of political inertia.
The diagram represents the increase and decrease in support accruing to particular policy positions as the CDMP simulation runs through the 10 turns.
The simulation results suggest that there are more highly divergent, but well-entrenched, interests at play in this CDMP as compared to the CDMP around overall policy reform.
In addition, analysis of the data regarding China's senior leadership, generally believed to be the most powerful and important actors for this CDMP, as compared to the weight of institutional inertia, supports the conclusions drawn from the baseline data sets.