Increasing the communication channels between S2 sections, HTTs, Red Teams, CA Teams, PSYOP Teams, along with other enablers, is a key factor in making Intelligence Sections more relevant in the prevention and mitigation of CIVCAS. An example is in order to highlight this issue.
A commonly stated argument by Afghans is, to paraphrase, "Insurgents wouldn't plant IEDs if the CF weren't present." The CF are regularly put into such paradoxical situations regarding CIVCAS in the public's perception.
As it is noted in the paper, Fixing Intel, coauthored by Major General Flynn, a "vast and underappreciated body of information, almost all of which is unclassified, admittedly offers few clues about where to find insurgents, but provides information of even greater strategic importance: a map for leveraging popular support and marginalizing the insurgency itself." (4) Reducing CF-caused CIVCAS, and communicating the fact that insurgents are the primary cause of CIVCAS, is possibly one of the most powerful tools to successfully conduct COIN that the CF can further refine.
Due to the importance of gaining Afghan local nationals' confidence and support, MI has an important role in preventing and controlling the negative effects of CIVCAS when caused by CF.
To more accurately and quickly address CIVCAS, S7 sections should proactively assist in contributing to the population-centric elements of IPB that S2 staffs develop.
A possible COA, and one discussed earlier, is utilizing Intelligence that supports specific efforts made to prevent CIVCAS (for example, as part of pre-operations check-lists similar to Karzai's 12).
It thus begs the question: Is any potential CIVCAS worth the operational risk of losing local national trust or confidence?
In conclusion, CIVCAS must be effectively prevented and mitigated in order to gain the trust of local nationals.
* Develop an Intel Fusion Cell at brigade level that assists in formulating CIVCAS preventive steps and coordinates this preparation with IO Sections.