Chief Justice Ritchie's judgment in Ex parte Renaud (39) delivered in February of 1873, is the first reported judgment to explicitly mention the CLVA. Ritchie C.J.
However, the CLVA was a liberating document, freeing the colonial legislatures from some of the more extravagant uses of the repugnancy doctrine and, in particular, the highly inconvenient rulings of Boothby J.
suggests; it was the uncertainty over its scope, prompted by Boothby J.'s holdings in South Australia, which had made the CLVA necessary.
plus the fact that he neglected to cite the CLVA in Chandler, suggests that he was relying on his intuitive understanding of the doctrine in the earlier case.
This is not a very significant objection to Ritchie C.J.'s decision if a closer scrutiny of the CLVA reveals that it did apply to the division of powers.
relied on repugnancy as a ground for the power to hold legislation ultra vires, his notion of repugnancy rested directly on his belief in the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament and not on that Parliament's will as expressed in the CLVA.
Ex parte Renaud is the only early case to rely specifically on the CLVA. Chandler and Cotte's Case43 appear to be the only additional cases to mention repugnancy or conflict with Imperial laws in order to justify judicial review.
Certainly the view that the CLVA was the source of the power of judicial review rests on such an identification of the two doctrines, but this was rarely made explicit in early judicial pronouncements.
As it happened, the distinction between local and Imperial affairs suggested by counsel had no basis in the CLVA itself but there was no way of knowing this without looking at the Act itself since as the distinction was certainly a plausible one.
If the Imperial/local distinction had been found in the Act, as suggested by counsel, the CLVA would not apply to the B.N.A.
This is why the courts so rarely referred to the CLVA in cases on the division of powers; excess of jurisdiction was an independent doctrine which obviated any need to do so.