Such activities do not include dredging and excavations, except for the purpose of obtaining small-scale samples, or drilling, except shallow drilling into rock and sediment to depths not exceeding 25 metres ..., (91) Considering that prospecting does not confer property rights, its definition essentially lists activities which are insufficient to create property rights under CRAMRA. This definition implies that the gathering of samples and observational testing of an area, no matter how extensive, would never have been sufficient under CRAMRA to confer property rights to the underlying minerals.
Interestingly, the definition of prospecting specifically excludes "dredging and excavations, except for the purpose of obtaining small-scale samples, or drilling, except shallow drilling into rock and sediment to depths not exceeding 25 metres." (93) Instead, these activities are categorized as "[exploration" under CRAMRA, which is defined as "activities ...
Looking more closely at the definitions of prospecting, exploration, and development in CRAMRA, it appears that they may have significant implications for how the treaty allocates property rights.
UNCLOS and CRAMRA both provide insight into how the USCSLC should be interpreted, though their contributions are somewhat conflicting.
(78.) CRAMRA introductory note (CRAMRA was convened to "elaborate a regime governing Antarctic mineral resource development should it ever come about.").
(84.) Blay & Tsamenyi, supra note 80, at 196; CRAMRA Chapter III (prospecting); CRAMRA Chapter IV (exploration); CRAMRA, Chapter V (development).
(89.) In addition to governing what an entity must do to be allowed to develop mining activities, CRAMRA requires that:
The nineteen parties to CRAMRA
were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, East Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, South Africa, South Korea, the USSR, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.
The Agreed Measures, the Seal Treaty, CCALMR, and CRAMRA are direct results of that effort.
Joyner describes in great detail the effort under CCAMLR to impose living resource use regulations in the region's maritime space (the Antarctic Convergence), the work to develop environmental regulations and protection rules related to minerals exploitation through the failed effort to promulgate CRAMRA, and the successful effort to replace it with the Env ironmental Protocol.
For example, CCAMLR is dealt with on pages 123-133 in Part II and on pages 306-314 and 365-367 in Part III; CRAMRA and the Madrid Protocol are dealt with on pages 133-149, on pages 335-341, and on pages 390-395.
In the Arctic, the role of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference has been particularly important, while in Antarctica, Greenpeace and other international environmental NGOs seem to have been particularly influential in the abandonment of CRAMRA and its replacement by the Madrid Protocol.