JP 0-2 effectively limits the application of DAFL under peacetime conditions by requiring its exercise in a manner "consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, DOD policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, and other specific conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." It is clear from this statement that DAFL should not result in a financial injustice among the services or a loss of ownership of service assets.
However, the JTLC would maintain visibility over logistics status, requirements, and assets and could exercise DAFL to the extent identified by the COCOM.
One aspect of this DAFL is cross-servicing to improve efficiency and reduce redundancy.
The next issue for consideration is the COCOM's directive authority for logistics (DAFL).
It is interesting to note that DAFL is a doctrinal (not legal) term that at times is used as a distinct authority not already inherent within combatant command.
The lack of reference to the previously determined combatant command authority seems to imply that DAFL is somehow a different power.
A logistics command and control organization is essential to making COCOM DAFL a reality.
First, a joint organizational construct must possess and execute DAFL. Second, this organization must use the reachback capabilities of the national logistics partners and the inherent capabilities of the service components.
The COCOM needs a control mechanism empowered with the legal authority to exercise DAFL on his behalf.
There is no direct connection between the CoCOM's planning and execution of common user support and the DAFL derived from 10 USC, Chapter 6.
JP 4-0 also has a discussion of common-user logistics (CUL) that attempts to break DAFL down into manageable types of supply and services as defined by the CoCOM.
The most important finding is that the President and the Secretary of Defense have sufficient authority under Title 10 to delegate DAFL over forces provided to CoCOMs.