Unfortunately, DOCEX was never a high priority in terms of training and resources as the Army entered World War II.
1st Army reached several conclusions about DOCEX intelligence: "documents arrived too late for operational exploitation" and "sufficient personnel were not trained to help Corps and Division levels".(6) Through the Korean War and into Vietnam, DOCEX remained relevant and necessary to gain intelligence on the enemy, but it was viewed as something temporary in nature.
Army DOCEX missions and functions were doctrinally pinned to interrogators: "the first intelligence specialists who could examine or exploit captured documents, in addition to interrogating prisoners of war, and will scan documents and extract information."(7) Accordingly, DOCEX procedures became firmly rooted within the interrogator Field Manual (FM) under the human intelligence (HUMINT) discipline.
The second problem was the direct result of placing DOCEX responsibilities on interrogators within HUMINT.
One intelligence leader stated: "DOCEX didn't work; we did our own DOCEX when we could.
No effective blueprint existed for standardized DOCEX instruction.
Materiel-There was no family of systems to cover a DOCEX end-to-end approach.
The 513th MI Brigade and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) both have methodologies to support DOCEX of computer media.
Meanwhile, a technical HUMINT specialist can execute digital media exploitation as a subdiscipline of DOCEX under existing DOCEX TTPs, authorities, and reporting procedures.