The excellent detection capability of DTCF is exacerbated when [P.
m] = 1, showing once again the DTCF excellent detection capability of malicious vehicles.
In contrast to the above, we now investigate the detection capability of our proposed DTCF per layer (within each layer) of the zone of interest [Z.
m] = 1 as they are null for different scenarios which clearly indicates that our proposed DTCF computes indeed exact trust metrics.
m] = 1 the excellent full detection capability (100%) of our proposed DTCF in both cases of F = 1 and F=0.
m], otherwise our proposed DTCF insures a very short detection delay less even than 1 second.
m](v) equal 0 and 1, we get null values indicating the excellent capability of our proposed DTCF to compute exact and consistent trust metrics.
We compare the average trust metric computed by DTCF to that computed by the TBSE protocol proposed in .
18, that DTCF and TBSE compute the same value of trust metrics in the case of a continuous malicious behavior.
We here propose a qualitative comparison between our proposed DTCF and three other proposals ,  and .
Table 4 presents a qualitative comparison between DTCF and the three relevant approaches [6, 7, 13] using the above criteria along with the use of a recommendation system and the necessity of Road Side Units (RSU).
DTCF fulfills all the above criteria despite the fact that it neither necessitates the use of RSUs nor being assisted by a recommendation system.