Evan Fales response to Plantinga's EAAN is by his own description "a substantial revision of 'Plantinga's Case against Naturalistic Epistemology," (10) an earlier paper.
In summary then, Fales attempts to undermine the EAAN by reevaluating the P (R/N & E) consist of charges that Plantinga did his calculating wrong.
In his article "Plantinga on Functions and the Theory of Evolution," Michael Levin takes aim first at Plantinga's claim that the idea of a natural function makes sense only within the context of theism and secondly, and for our purposes all importantly, at Plantinga's EAAN.
So whatever the foregoing quote is driving at, it seems irrelevant to the EAAN.
First, it behooves us to recognize the difficulties in what has been said so far in his reply to the EAAN.
Plantinga does not discuss this difficulty because he seemingly holds the EAAN to be so strong in general that limiting its force to an attack on only the more abstract of a naturalist's beliefs seems moot (although I suspect he has other reasons as well).
But to his credit he introduces a bogey the naturalist will face even if initial replies to the EAAN defending perceptual or memory beliefs are successful.
Plantinga seems clearly to hold that in the case of the EAAN in particular, defeat will clearly still occur .
The probability estimates made by the EAAN are admittedly imprecise, but enough can be reasonably pointed out about them such as will be sufficient for the sake of the EAAN.
In "Plantinga, Naturalism and Defeat," William Alston critically examines the EAAN found in Plantinga's unpublished "Naturalism Defeated," focusing on the "main argument.
Therefore, it might be justly concluded that Plantinga's EAAN depends vitally upon the assumption that either P (R/ N & E & C) is low as well or that P (~C/ N & E) is high.
In this section, I discuss both and argue that they give us no reason to despair over our abilities at rationally assessing P (R/N & E) and hence do not block the EAAN.