Resnick asserted "his FMWA claim as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
In sum, regarding the enforceability of the notice provision in order to file a claim under either the Amendment or the FMWA, the Resniek Court concluded that "[section] 448.1 10(6) is binding and enforceable" because "the Florida Legislature could constitutionally create implementing legislation under Article X, Section 24, and because the specific implementing legislation passed ...
The Resnick opinion only names one case in particular, and it was to distinguish the case from that of the FMWA notice provision.
(144) But, unlike as recognized by the Throw Court in regards to the FMWA's notice provision, (145) it was not really a close question in Notami.
Notably, no such distinction could be made in the case of the FMWA notice provision.
(172) Thus, it is fairly evident that the constitutional violation in Sparkman was not a matter of a close question as in the case of the FMWA's notice provision, and possibly indicates that in comparison the FMWA's notice provision would likely be determined to be constitutional by the Florida Supreme Court.
Another telling case, although far less obviously related to the issues swirling around the FMWA, is Bain v.
Considering the jurisdictional nature in which the FMWA's notice provision was applied in the Resnick case, where the court dismissed the FMWA claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), (180) the Bain and Amendments discussions regarding the constitutionality of the Criminal Appeal Reform Act underscores the weakness of the argument that the FMWA's mere notice prerequisite to filing suit violates the constitution.
In fact, in the Resnick case, the plaintiff's FMWA claim was dismissed so that the plaintiff could give his former employer notice of his intent to sue for unpaid minimum wages under the Amendment and the FMWA.
(202) As the Baker court noted, the constitutional provision was purposefully self-executing, but the clause immediately following this self-executing provision was "an express grant of authority empowering the legislature to 'establish reasonable exemptions' relating to the rights guaranteed." (203) This provision is extremely similar to the constitutional language used to support the creation of the FMWA's notice provision.
(206) And similar to the language in Baker, the FMWA states that it is the exclusive remedy for violations of the Amendment.
How should the FMWA and the Amendment be interpreted in future cases?