In the GLSP this strategy was not adopted because it was realized by the lay public that it was the City (and not the public per se) that was technically the client in the final instance.
This was in evidence in terms of the self-education process in which many lay participants in the GLSP engaged.
Responding to one exercise in the GLSP, this individual noted that
However, this strategy was not available to lay GLSP participants because of the fact that their property could be legally appropriated by the City.
From the above discussion it can be seen that there were several indications of lay distrust of technical experts in the GLSP.
The expectation that the technical expert's fiduciary duties would be upheld was questioned by some GLSP participants (particularly by those in the neighbourhood groups).
We have already discussed some of the uncertainties involved in the determination of leachate generation and contamination, but GLSP participants were also directly exposed to various flaws and shortcomings in the actual technical methods employed in the landfill siting procedure.
From the above, we can see that lack of trust in both the technical competence and the fiduciary responsibility of the experts was clearly evident in the GLSP.
But, what is notable about the occurrence of these factors in the GLSP is that their presence is symptomatic of an underlying quality of trust in the risk society.
The lack of trust in experts evident in the GLSP may also reflect the broader societal trend of the general decline in deference to professionals (see for example Fischer, 1990; Coleman, 1990; Lasch, 1984; Waller, 1994).
In this sense, the GLSP represents a response to the recognized need to share decision-making power.
This is seen most clearly in the matter of risk distribution, which in the GLSP was conceived in terms of social equity (in regard to the arguments put forth by the Victoria Road group).