Despite this early contemplation of the indivisibility of rights, the GPIR found this model to be unmanageable, at least in terms of their prescribed task of designing an administrative program to address a specific timeframe of the internal armed conflict.
Consequently, the GPIR adopted a narrower concept of reparations and presented the PIR only as a step towards justice, with the understanding that reforming structural social problems was a larger undertaking better left to recommendations of institutional reform.
Interestingly, the GPIR's deliberations foreshadowed many of the problems with the implementation of an administrative reparations scheme that provides collective reparations.
The GPIR predicted that if reparations were not directly linked to the occurrence of CPR violations, and thus awarded to direct victim-survivors, they would lose their meaning as reparations for those abuses.
As discussed, the GPIR sought to avoid exactly this predicament, abandoning the focus on repairing causes of the internal armed conflict for fear that the PIR would then aspire "to achieve the goals of the whole transitional process instead of just an important piece of it." (194)