As will be discussed in more detail below, according to the Directorate, the reason why the manufacture and sale of sNA should not be (and are not) regulated under the HPTA and HPTR is, in a nutshell, that sNA is not (at least generally speaking) inherently risky, either as a chemical substance or as a genetic element.
(31) However, neither synthetic biology nor sNA are explicitly mentioned in the HPTA or the HPTR.
While neither synthetic biology nor sNA is explicitly mentioned in the HPTA nor the HPTR, the Directorate states: "Existing legislation is sufficiently broad to apply to the manufacture of synthetic DNA and the activities surrounding it including storage, disposal, release etc." (38) Elsewhere in the same document, it qualifies that claim, saying that "[i]n most cases definitions or "triggers" under key legislation ...
The RIAS for the HPTR also describes Canada's approach as "risk-based" in the sense that it regulates activities involving pathogens and toxins in accordance with their degree of risk of harm to public health and safety.
(97) For the HPTR, an analysis of the main costs and benefits of the HTPR was conducted, although it was acknowledged that it was not possible to quantify all expected impacts.
The proposed HPTR aim to establish national requirements for safe handling of human pathogens and toxins that would apply to all persons who possess or use these agents in Canada, in any type of facility, regardless of how they were generated.
(142) The RIAS refers to the 2001 US anthrax "attack" that resulted in five deaths and cost an estimated $1 billion and states that, to reduce the "social and economic disruption" from such attacks, the HPTR would increase the stringency of controls over anthrax and other more "security-sensitive human pathogens and toxins".
(166) Carrie observed that the HPTA "would render Canada more consistent with its international partners and allies, including the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, which have all passed new security legislation." (167) The RIAS later made a similar claim with respect to the HPTR, saying that it "would bring Canada into closer regulatory alignment with biosecurity and biosafety regimes in other countries such as the United States and Australia." (168) It states further that "[international consistency in the approach to controlling access to the most dangerous human pathogens and toxins can be a deterrent for those with malicious intent." (169)
HPTR, HPTS, SegI and SegS, also supports a polygenic inheritance, with segregation of a minimum of three to four independent genes in all crosses (Table 3).
[F.sub.2]/2000 Saar 0 2 217 Simorgh 3 2 272 Homa 1 3 258 Parastoo 0 3 242 Cocoons 0 3 225 Lines with reaction ([double dagger]) HPTR HPTS SegI SegS No.