As with the CLEAR Act, the HSEA affirms states' authority to enforce immigration laws, (74) and conditions certain federal funding on the states' not preventing state and local enforcement of such laws.
78) In support of the contention that state cooperation under these proposals is voluntary, proponents emphasize that both the CLEAR Act and the HSEA do not require that state and local officials assist in enforcement of immigration laws, but merely tie certain federal funds to the decision on whether to permit it.
Both the CLEAR Act and the HSEA would seek to deny funding through section 1231(i) to any state that restricts the ability of state and local law enforcement to enforce immigration laws.
84) In the CLEAR Act and the HSEA, federal funds for the incarceration of criminal aliens are conditioned upon the states' cooperation in enforcing immigration violations.
88) This second metric seems more helpful when analyzing the coerciveness of the CLEAR Act and the HSEA.
On the other hand, given that so many police departments view the CLEAR Act and the HSEA as coercive, (91) there may be specific reasons to think that denial of SCAAP funding for some localities could constitute the type of coercion that would fail the Dole test.
It is also worth considering the extent to which the CLEAR Act and the HSEA represent a "back door" approach to commandeering.