An English language proficiency at the 3-level proved inadequate for staff officers operating in the field; either at NORDPOL Brigade HQ at Doboj, Bosnia-Herzegovina--where 21 and 38 officers served during IFOR and SFOR respectively--or at the Nordic Support Group in Pecs, Hungary.
The Czech IFOR contingent totaled 920 (30 at HQ, a Mechanized Battalion of 872 troops, and 18 for helicopter operations); and a SFOR contingent of 644 (22 at HQ, a mechanized battalion troops of 600 troops, and 22 for helicopter operations--the only non-NATO air units in the field).
Initial problems resulted because the Czechs lacked experience in operating in multinational commands and a Czech representative was not present in the British IFOR sector command in Zagreb.
Hence, when the Czechs established their IFOR contingent they decided to staff one-half of it with reserve officers, who were either veterans of UNPROFOR, the Rapid Deployment Brigade, or the elite Prostejov Airborne Brigade.
Romania, as with Hungary, contributed the non-combat Engineering Battalion 96, with 200 troops, to IFOR and SFOR, which was subordinated to the ARRC command in Sarajevo.
Three planning factors are pivotal to an IFOR follow-on force.
If an IFOR follow-on force is needed, options include:
Of these options, only a NATO-led force would be capable of enforcing peace by December 1996, when IFOR redeploys.
A post-IFOR force might be considered if some IFOR missions had to continue beyond 12 months.
IFOR has defined its support for civilian implementation as being to:
Paul Newman, managing director of IFOR
, said: "We're not just here to provide solutions to IT problems, our aim is to be pro-active in preventing them.