The JCLL was expected to contribute significantly to the J7's overall responsibility "for evaluating the preparedness and effectiveness of the unified and specified commands to carry out their assigned missions." (10) Three basic elements of lessons learned, identified in the 1985 GAO report, were brought together within one organization.
The JWFC commander and DJ7 formalized a JCLL Implementation Plan in early 1997, which split joint lessons learned program responsibilities between their two organizations, with production and analysis concentrated in the JWFC while leaving policy and oversight of the program in the Pentagon with the J7.
During the subsequent year, this arrangement appeared to function reasonably well, with the JCLL beginning to broaden the scope of its efforts to perform trend analysis on JAARS data for potential un- or under-reported issues throughout the joint force.
Over the next year (2001-2002), the JCLL found opportunities to explore the benefits of actively collecting observation data first at the request of the commander of Task Force 160 (Guantanamo Bay Detainee Operations), and later with the Army's 10th Mountain Division in Operation Enduring Freedom.
As planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) neared completion in early 2003, the USJFCOM commander knew immediately that the task of active data collection would be well beyond the capability and means of the 1 government civilian and 10 contractors assigned to the JCLL. On February 3, 2003, he tasked the USJFCOM J7 and the JWFC to build the necessary collection team, drawing resources from across the command.
On the JCLL
level, it can involve analysis of observations from participating organizations to determine potential issues and trends requiring mediation by the Joint Staff, for example, under the Chairman's Remedial Action Program.