When compared to the resident JCWS program, the satellite curriculum has only two unique elements.
As visions and resources changed over the last decade, only the quality of life element remains; currently, 1 percent of JCWS graduates per year attend the satellite program.
(14) More information about the satellite program is available at <http://jfsc.ndu.edu/ Academics/JointandCombinedWarfightingSchool(JCWS).aspx>.
Advanced Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME) is patterned on the same Officer Professional Military Education Policy objectives as the JCWS curriculum and educates RC officers in the deployment, employment, synchronization, and support of joint and multinational forces.
The Joint Transition Course (JTC) is a JCWS preparatory course for DoD and interagency civilians, international officers and those who have not completed JPME Phase I.
Interview with Captain David DiOrio, Dean, Joint and Combined Warfighting School: Why should International Officers be in the JCWS program?
prepared me for the cultural and military differences for each of the 10 coalition partners participating in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) naval patrols.
(24) AC officers do not attend AJPME because it does not give them joint education credit despite a curriculum virtually identical to JCWS. AJPME is unable to award the type of credit (JPME Phase II) AC officers need to become joint qualified officers.
The Joint Forces Staff College shares faculty and content across the 10-week residential JCWS and AJMPE.
(10) Then, after a year or two of OJT, when staff officers have learned joint basics the "hard way" and can effectively perform their duties without assistance from more experienced staff officers, they are frequently sent to JCWS for the 10-week JPME II curriculum and become unavailable to do staff work.
Currently, the distribution of student seats for JCWS is based proportionally on the number of joint billets each Service is assigned on the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL).
The GAO, in reviewing whether the SSA's decision was reasonable, consistent with the RFP's evaluation criteria, and adequately documented, (125) stated that the SSA's contemporaneous documentation was "devoid of any substantive consideration as to whether JCWS
's proposal was a better value to the government than DynCorp's lower-rated, lower-priced proposal." (126) The SSA's "generalized statements" that there were "no discernable benefits" in other proposals that outweighed the "significant advantage" of DynCorp's lower-rated and lower-priced proposal "fall far short of the requirement to justify cost/technical tradeoff decisions." (127)