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The SOLE lacks the planning and coordination intimacy inherent to a resident JFFC. The SOLE's separation in both time and space from the JSOTF JOC further degrades mission effectiveness.
In the absence of a bona fide JFFC acting as an honest broker, the joint fires process inevitably focuses on airpower while inadvertently ignoring surface- and sea-based assets, (21) not to mention nonlethal means.
(22) The lack of a resident JFFC responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing the full spectrum of joint fires elements leaves the J3 and employed SOF vulnerable, having to improvise solutions to the integration challenges of fire support and maneuver.
Moreover, the absence of a JFFC to formally advise the commander on fire support matters arguably contributes to the willingness to go it alone, a tragic flaw seemingly all too common among SOF.
A study prepared by the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) examined the viability of a JFFC concept from the viewpoint of the JFC.
The JWFC study recommended, "The JFC needed a JFFC to be the impartial arbiter for joint fires, manage scarce resources, ensure the commander's guidance is being followed and intent accomplished, maintain a focus on what to preserve or destroy, deconflict lethal and nonlethal fires, champion JFC fires needs, and help the JFC maintain situational awareness." (28) A JFFC offers further value added by assisting the J3 and JFC in synchronizing joint fires with other aspects of the campaign to include maneuver, communications, IO, and logistics.
To improve the successful integration, synchronization, and application of fires for the JSOTF, a JFFC must be institutionalized as a permanent part of the HQ staff serving as a senior subordinate to the J3 with authorities delegated by the commander.
The JFFC serves as the principal staff advisor to the J3 and JSOTF commander responsible for the coordination, integration, and synchronization of joint fires.
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