ground forces are not employed, consideration of a JFLCC
team to conduct planning and provide input covering some or all of the functions is essential.
8) The unaddressed assumption implies that the JFACC must request from the JFLCC that either the Joint Security Coordinator extend what JP 3-10 refers to as the base boundary beyond the immediate perimeter of the base cantonment area to encompass the "footprint" of potential SAM launch sites when hosting JFACC assets, or task the battle-space owners of JSAs outside base boundaries to use their own resources to undertake the actions necessary to meet JFACC security requirements for defense of aircraft approach and departure corridors.
The JFACC SAA is thus dependent upon the JFLCC JSA commanders or base commanders to dedicate limited manpower resources to occupying or patrolling potential SAM launch sites along aircraft approach and departure corridors in support of the JFACC security requirements.
This situation drives the need for enhancing the joint doctrine for air base defense found in JP 3-10 to provide directive guidance that will assist in identifying the SAM threat to aerial approach and departure corridors as a joint force priority (and delineate component responsibilities for addressing it) during the tasking process in order to incorporate these requirements into either the JFACC or JFLCC allocated forces and command and control responsibilities.
It can be argued that no seam actually exists with regard to securing approach and departure corridors because JP 3-10 mentions that "in support of the JFC's concept of operations, the JFLCC plans and conducts security operations to ensure protection of US .
On larger scale operations where the I Corps staff is acting as a JFLCC
or CTF, the IMO is caught up playing the conventional albeit misguided role of 'technical automator', particularly in getting operations center systems set-up and configured.
The SBCT is designed to sustain operations for up to 180 days without relief, and is designed to operate under a division, or under a corps headquarters designated as the ARFOR, JFLCC
MAGTF target nominations are forwarded to the JFLCC deep operations coordination center for deliberation at the daily targeting board and subsequent submission to the combined coordination board.
Certain scenarios may require JFCs to assign MAGTF tactical control to JFLCCs, who then designate an area of operations for the task force.
By requesting an attack against target sets located outside AORs, JFLCCs
must request and coordinate through other functional components.