Although KESE aims to get philosophers of science to use the work of sociology of science and science studies, KESE falls short in its discussion of sociology of science and science studies since KESE does not specify which sociology of science or science studies philosophers of science should consult.
KESE maintains that Kuhn proposes that philosophers work with sociologists of science to develop an epistemology of science as an extension to Quine's naturalistic epistemology (180).
KESE agrees with Barnes and Fuller that Kuhn is an apologist for science because Kuhn does not want to challenge the "epistemic authority of science" (93).
Though KESE notes that for Kuhn, scientific knowledge is produced by scientific research groups, which is an aggregation of similarly trained scientists, KESE does not discuss how scientific knowledge is either justified or certified.
As regards Kuhn's social epistemology, though KESE notes that the training of scientists is critical in normal science, KESE does not discuss the role that tacit knowledge plays in the training of scientists.
In KESE's discussion of Kuhn's instrumental rationality, KESE does not refer to Kuhn's practical rationality.