Army was overstretched and Korea was such a forbidding assignment, KMAG strength usually fell far short of its requirements.
The major problem was not that either KMAG or the Republic of Korea was indifferent to leadership, but rather that both lacked any solid means for assessing it.
advisory effort that was in every respect more lavish and more intense than that of the KMAG.
This failure to promote on the basis of merit largely squandered an American advisory effort patterned on KMAG, even though it was more robust in almost every respect than its predecessor.
advisory effort had been going on for twice as long as it had taken KMAG to produce an effective ROK army.
The pair collected between 500 and 600 soldiers, who were put under the control of a KMAG officer.
division so it could fire into the 5th ROK Division sector, with a liaison team dispatched to the division KMAG detachment.
liaison officers discovered that constant close contact with KMAG officers was essential.
Language and cultural differences were only partially overcome by bringing KMAG advisors into fire support operations.