LHWCALongshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
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regarded as seamen; if not, they are covered by the LHWCA because
Pea then filed a claim for medical compensation for surgery in New York against Calzadilla and IMS under the LHWCA.
The Court held that coverage under the LHWCA, as extended by OCSLA, is
(74) Unseaworthiness was no longer a remedy to those whom the LHWCA applied.
amending the LHWCA in 1972, which was to expand coverage, apply uniform
The LHWCA compensates for injuries incurred by certain overseas workers, but excludes payments "if the injury was occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee or by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another." (96) The administrative law judge, who heard one expert attribute Eysselinck's suicide in part to alcohol consumption, (97) reasoned that the claimant had the burden of proving that her husband's suicide resulted from "an irresistible impulse to kill himself." (98) The claimant failed to prove that her husband "suffered from a mental disease or impairment that created the impulse leading to the suicide." (99) In concrete terms, she was unable to prove that her husband's PTSD made suicide an involuntary act.
In an attempt to "resolve confusion over how to determine whether a watercraft is a 'vessel' for purposes of the LHWCA," the Supreme Court noted that 1 U.S.C.
For maritime workers lacking a sufficient vessel relationship to qualify as seamen, Congress passed the LHWCA in 1927 to provide both compensation and medical benefits for work-related injury, disability, or death while upon the navigable waters of the United States.
(102) Both the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA), (103) which covers appropriated fund employees, and the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA), (104) which covers non-appropriated fund (NAF) employees, allow federal government employees to recover for on the job mental or emotional injuries.
Entitlement to medical benefits for eligible miners did not arise until the 1972 Act when Congress merely imported the current medical benefits structure of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).(72) Rather than create a separate process and associated presumptions for medical benefits, Congress adopted wholesale a preexisting statutory and regulatory framework created primarily for the compensation of occupational injury rather than occupational disease.(73) This failure to address the difference between injury and disease calls into question the Sixth Circuit's assertion that Congress had a clear intent about presumptions on this issue at all.
Third, the Court in Yamaha noted that the 1972 amendments to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C.
Papai(69) construed the Jones Act(70) and the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA).(71) The question was whether an injured maritime employee was a "master or member of a crew of any vessel" within the meaning of the LHWCA, and thus exempt from the LHWCA's worker's compensation-only remedies and entitled, instead, to sue for tort damages under the Jones Act.