In 1987, MATFA had applied to have the 1982 amendments overturned and the preceding award reinstated.
When MATFA launched its appeal against the 1982 award variation, it also urged its members not to sign s.
The AMIEU approached MATFA to discuss the 38-hour week in 1986 and, in 1987, applied to the Commission for its introduction through the VMBA.
The tendency for companies to hand over much of their primary bargaining responsibilities to MATFA tended to produce a more confrontational approach.
This, in turn, largely determined the relative roles of individual companies and MATFA.
Thus, at the start of the VMBA Dispute, employers had invested MATFA with a powerful and central role that reinforced that association's antagonistic relationship with the union.
On behalf of meat industry employers and its own organisational purpose, MATFA therefore faced the need to deal with two strategic priorities that could be tightly related, but that MATFA could also win or lose separately.
30) In authorising this campaign, senior management of these companies freely adopted the MATFA strategy of using legal processes and leverage from industrial confrontation to break the union's power.
Careful to avoid calling out its entire membership in Victoria at any one time, the union's response was to organise a series of rolling stoppages at the plants of those employers spearheading the MATFA campaign.
The MATFA campaign, through the Commission and through member employers' own responses to union pressure for s.
38) This was not the role that MATFA had envisaged for the Commission when it had made its strategic choices in launching the VMBA Dispute.
At the height of the VMBA dispute, in which AMIEU members were carrying out rolling stoppages on a weekly basis at most export abattoirs, (39) MATFA sought to have the Federal Court de-register the Victorian Branch of the AMIEU.