Non-NPT NWS, especially India and Pakistan, had a substantive impact on the non-proliferation and MECRs. The nuclear order defined in both the regimes began to crack the legal and normative foundation of the NPT, which was substantially weakened as a result of South Asian nuclear tests in 1998.
In the case of MECRs, the situation becomes further depressing when one realizes that, presently, four non-NPT states have become nuclear-capable states.
On the other hand, constructivist pessimists argue that 'the chief source of instability' is generated in the 'peculiar construction of national identity and interest on the part of the chief regional actors.' Therefore, any development on nuclear front by the major regional player, including India both in conventional, strategic military and in the realm of MECRs, would obviously impact the strategic thinking of other regional states and Pakistan would compel them to adopt political and strategic policy discourse accordingly.
Therefore, the 'complex economic interdependency' is expanding across various countries that would tend to undermine the security mechanisms of MECRs in globalized world.
At the regional and global levels, the social constructivist view holds that India has been socialized into the positivism thinking of cooperative security through the Indo-US nuclear deal, which has included the NSG waiver and ongoing discussions to pave way for its inclusion into MECRs.
At the domestic level, states tend to regulate the safety and security architecture of their nuclear and critical dual-use technology in harmony with MECRs standardized good practices.
Moreover, by taking the state in MECRs loop can enable the international community to monitor states activities and this will make the regimes more effective and credible.
MECRs need to be strengthened to counter the emerging threats to global security, of which nuclear terrorism is one particularly potent and pressing concern.
The accord between the emergent strategic partners of 21st century for their narrow strategic objectives would continue to undermine the principles and the norms of non-proliferation as enshrined in various MECRs. It was based on civilian nuclear cooperation between the two states, but due to US concerns over India's laws on liability in the event of a nuclear accident, there was a stalemate on the transparency issue, as whether US will monitor the nuclear materials intended for peaceful usage or whether it would be determined by the IAEA safeguards.
The discriminatory criteria can disharmonize the very structure of the regimes and cause serious challenges for the MECRs.
Foregoing in perspective, it can be deduced that in order to enhance the efficacy and credibility of nuclear MECRs, it is necessary to include the four non-NPT NWS into the non-proliferation fold.
Therefore, it is imperative that MECRs revise their agenda toward the nuclear proliferation due to increasing influx of NSAs in the post-Cold War and Westphalian world.