Indeed, NATO designed its NATINADS to defend against military aircraft, and all alliance members have generally agreed upon air-defense rules of engagement (ROE) during a conventional conflict.
Specific NATINADS procedures developed after September 2001 identified the engagement authority for suspected terrorists and the ways in which each member nation would authorize and conduct a final engagement.
The CZAF maintained MiG-21 fighter aircraft on alert daily as part of the NATINADS and protected key infrastructure with SAMs, thus providing the means to engage terrorist attacks against Czech territory or to broadly defend against a series of attacks against central Europe in general.
Despite the number of workable C2 options available to meet the needs of the situation, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe wanted to counter terrorist air operations by having the NATINADS provide surveillance and initial identification of a potential threat.
In his capacity as AIRNORTH commander, he oversaw operations for the northern half of the NATINADS, including the Czech Republic as well as neighboring Germany and Poland.
AIRNORTH would ensure the reinforcement of NATINADS and see that it maintained surveillance and situational awareness, not only within the Czech Republic but also throughout central Europe.
NATO's ROEs would remain in effect up to the point at which the Czechs desired to transfer authority from the NATINADS to the CZAF during the process of investigating a suspected air terrorist.
Normally, the NCC operated within the NATINADS as a control and reporting center that reported to CAOC-4, an arrangement which simplified the mechanics of a transfer of authority.