The problem with this connection that NDPF points out is as follows.
This strategy is considered in Case II of the proof, where it is shown that, similar to the NDPF decentralization, a shirker can do as well as the non-shirker, but the IC constraint implies that he cannot do better.
In thinking about the possible institutional arrangements that can support the optimal allocation [A.sup.*], the unsecured credit model we study in this section is an alternative to the NDPF tax model we discussed earlier.
The product in [K.sub.0](NDPF) is quite general thanks to [[DHS.sup.+]11].
Thanks to Theorem 2.6 we can explicit the product in [K.sub.0](NDPF).
Proposition 6.5 The map [K.sub.0](NDPF) [right arrow] NCSF defined by [[P.sub.I]] [right arrow] [R.sub.I] is an algebra isomorphism.
As noted in a recent contribution to the NDPF literature, when
Here the NDPF literature becomes especially pertinent, as it expressly
In an NDPF framework, the implication might instead be levying
The NDPF literature is still too young to have produced
NDPF literature include Mikhail Golosov et al., Optimal Indirect and
(13.) As with myopia, the NDPF literature makes an assumption that