In some cases, except those in which a spouse is the sole beneficiary, those estates will be subject to the New Jersey estate tax (NJSA section 54.39-1[a]).
A transfer by deed, grant, bargain, sale, or gift made more than three years before the decedent's death is not considered to be in contemplation of death; however, any such transfer made within three years of death is considered to be made in contemplation of death and is taxed accordingly, unless the contrary can be proven (see NJSA sections 53:34-1 and 18:26-5.7; this issue will be discussed in greater detail in a later section).
Alternatively, the proceeds may be made payable to the trustee of a trust created under the decedent's will (NJSA sections 54:34-4 [c] and [f]).
Therefore, proceeds payable to an individual beneficiary could be subject to the New Jersey estate tax; proceeds payable to a trust, however, would not be subject to this tax (NJSA section 54:34-11).
A second planning opportunity involves the rule that gifts made within three years of death are, without evidence to the contrary, presumed to have been made in contemplation of death and are added back to the estate (NJSA section 54:34-11).
Under NJSA 17:28-1-1b, UIM coverage is discretionary, not mandatory.
Under the "parity" provision of NJSA 17:28-1.1b, Aubrey's right to recover under insured benefits under the Harleysville policy would be limited to that amount.
New York, New Jersey, and Florida impose sales taxes on these types of services (New York Tax Law section 1105[c], NJSA
54:32B-[b], and Florida Stat.
One exception, found in the Sales Tax Act, gives limited relief to the refund statute of limitations under NJSA
On state grounds, it held that the destination sales rules of NJSA
54:10A-6(B)(1)(2) were not the exclusive method for the apportionment of receipts from the sales of tangible personal property and that the director was not precluded from utilizing NJSA
54:10-6(B)(6) to reflect the taxpayer's activity within the state.
The court refused to allow the Nets to claim the sales tax exemption of the NJSEA for the impost fee, reasoning that, although the agency was the beneficiary of the charge, it was not the purchaser, user, or consumer as required by NJSA 54:32B-9(a)(1).
Nothing in the decision indicates that the court considered any argument that the impost fee was a tax which was not considered within the ambit of the definition of taxable receipt under NJSA 54:32B-3 and associated regulation NJAC 18:24-1.4.