Because SOEs are provided with more abundant resources domestically than NSOEs, which can be an alternative to the key resources that firms obtain internationally, SOEs are comparably less dependent on international markets than NSOEs.
We found that NSOEs are less likely to donate than SOEs, given the same level of internationalization.
We observed that because of state ownership and the unequal access to state-controlled resources, NSOEs are less likely or able to make charitable donations to their home country, even though they might be willing to do so.
We use large firm-level micro panel data of Chinese NSOEs for the 1998-2007 period.
As previous research suggests, trade credit is an important source of corporate financing for NSOEs in China, for which data are used in the present econometric analysis.
In other words, trade credit financially supports investment by NSOEs.
In summary, trade credit in the form of notes and accounts payable tends to be more developed and play an important role in corporate financing by NSOEs, particularly in financing investment where interfirm trust is stronger and the market is more competitive.
In contrast, NSOE issuers face a greater risk of adverse selection by public investors and the CSRC.
As argued above, NSOE issuers face higher levels of adverse selection as investors and the CSRC more concerned about the accounting information of NSOEs than that of SOEs.
By the inferences from both the signaling and mitigating arguments, we hypothesize that underwriter reputation is negatively associated with earnings management for NSOE issuers.
Mansfield, Assistant Professor of Environmental Economics at NSOE.
Kramer, Professor of Resource and Environmental Economics at NSOE, and Stephen M.