Iraq's burgeoning CTS requires training and equipping, and, as mentioned earlier, OSC-I and its predecessor organizations have been powerless to assist them without special legislative authority.
Absent ISFF or other special authorities, all OSC-I training and advisory missions involving uniformed military personnel would cease.
The use of CCIF allowed the continuation of the OSC-I training mission, but at the cost of approximately 20 percent of OSC-I personnel because using the CCIF did not permit as broad a training mission as authorized under the ISFF.
OSC-I suffered because of these varied opinions as it accepted the mantle from United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I).
The TAC met with OSC-I personnel, and the A/1-5 commander met with the security contractor supervisor.
Our maintenance personnel worked to make and keep the fleet of OSC-I up-armored SUVs (UASs) operational.
It could have delayed training considerably, but the 1-5 Cavalry commander, A/1-5 commander, and OSC-I officer in charge (OTC) briefed the SATs on the concept for security the following day.
At the battalion level, the TAC continued to work with OSC-I to build capacity with mission command systems, introduce OSC-I personnel to a few key local Iraqi leaders, and arbitrate between the IA and IAF in order to preserve the amber zone.
As stated in the OSC-I FY 2013 OCO budget request to OSD, "The OSC-I will conduct the full range of traditional SC activities such as joint exercise planning, combined arms training, conflict resolution, multilateral peace operations, senior-level visits, and other forms of bilateral engagement.
When participating in the FMS program, the requesting country (in our case, Iraq) submits a Letter of Request (LOR) to the applicable implementing agency (IA) via the OSC-I, DSCA, and DoS, outlining the specifics of the items, equipment, or services being requested.
In coordination with the OSC-I Training and Travel section, the Comptroller office funds the IMET program.
Additionally, with the transition from military to civilian responsibility in Iraq, the OSC-I must contend with and converge DoD and DoS responsibilities, applicable requirements and funding sources.