43) However, I will argue that those conclusions still overlook the force of the main Hegelian criticism to the Kantian presentation of the OSUA as the principle justifying the objectivity of experience: the lack of a self-justification of that grounding; an absence which calls for the activation of presuppositionless thinking in order to recognize that the gathering, the conceptual unity within thinking lives in, justifies itself.
In this sense, I resume to the two basic ideas we have been working with in the previous section: the idea that the OSUA plays the role of the basic principle of justification in Kant's philosophy and the idea that Hegel's Notion directly draws on that model of justification.
The lengthy quotation could be summarized up in a crucial charge: the Kantian infidelity to the gathering movement of the Notion; that is to say, once Kant has introduced the function of the Notion under the term 'original synthesis of apperception' (the OSUA we have been referring to) he would have been in condition to justify the consciousness' movement from the individuality of the subjectively intuited to the universality of the objectively valid concepts (44) as the to-and-fro motion of gathering and differentiation of thinking which is expressed in the synthetic judgments a priori.
The remarks coming out from the first position could be answered by pointing out the Hegelian appropriation of the Kantian OSUA to formulate his own conception of the Notion.
In the present paper I have tried to present Kant's OSUA as the movement of that gathering expressed in terms of the pure articulation of meaning; a movement whose thought is the basic issue of Hegel's Logic.