The reason why Hegel praises the OSUA is because it overcomes the metaphysical positions supposing that meaning comes to life only when is bridged the gulf between an inert item and that thing called 'thought' (the bridging relation described by the phrase: 'the mere representation of the relation in which the I stands to the understanding, or notions stand to a thing') through the intervention of the 'tools' provided by the rules and principles of thinking.
In that sense, the Notion dwells in the space opened by the Kantian OSUA to the extent that both concepts embrace a normative idea of thinking.
Nevertheless, in contrast to Kant's OSUA the Hegelian Notion is not a grammatical subject, the 'I think' accompanying my representations, but the deploying of the self-relating activity which articulates the space of determinations.
If the main contentions of the previous exposition are right, then it would seem reasonable to think, against the hypothesis we have claimed before, that the disagreement between Kant and Hegel--which triggered out the latter's demand of a presuppositionless beginning--consist in that the former lacks of a true discursive justification of the logical movement of thinking, not only that Kant does actually possess an universal principle of justification of the objectivity of experience (the OSUA) but also that such principle is at the base of the Hegelian understanding of self-consciousness (the Notion).
(43) However, I will argue that those conclusions still overlook the force of the main Hegelian criticism to the Kantian presentation of the OSUA as the principle justifying the objectivity of experience: the lack of a self-justification of that grounding; an absence which calls for the activation of presuppositionless thinking in order to recognize that the gathering, the conceptual unity within thinking lives in, justifies itself.
In this sense, I resume to the two basic ideas we have been working with in the previous section: the idea that the OSUA plays the role of the basic principle of justification in Kant's philosophy and the idea that Hegel's Notion directly draws on that model of justification.
The lengthy quotation could be summarized up in a crucial charge: the Kantian infidelity to the gathering movement of the Notion; that is to say, once Kant has introduced the function of the Notion under the term 'original synthesis of apperception' (the OSUA we have been referring to) he would have been in condition to justify the consciousness' movement from the individuality of the subjectively intuited to the universality of the objectively valid concepts (44) as the to-and-fro motion of gathering and differentiation of thinking which is expressed in the synthetic judgments a priori.
The remarks coming out from the first position could be answered by pointing out the Hegelian appropriation of the Kantian OSUA to formulate his own conception of the Notion.